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The crises of the 1990s convinced many observers that intermediate exchange rate arrangements 
are fragile and crisis prone.  But advising emerging markets to abandon the exchange rate as an anchor 
for policy compels those issuing the call to offer an alternative.  This paper asks whether inflation 
targeting is a viable alternative for emerging markets.  It focuses on the distinctive characteristics of the 
policy environment that bear on its feasibility: fast passthrough, the difficulty of forecasting inflation, 
liability dollarization, and imperfect credibility.   
                                                           
1Revision of a paper presented to a seminar at the Central Bank of Brazil.  An earlier version was presented at the 
Bank of England. For helpful comments I thank Lawrence Ball, Paul Masson, Rick Mishkin, Peter Sinclair, Lars Svensson, 




1.  Introduction 
The hot debate over the best monetary-cum-exchange-rate regime for developing countries 
shows no signs of cooling down.  The Asian crisis and its fallout in Latin America and Eastern Europe 
have convinced many observers that soft currency pegs are crisis prone and that emerging markets 
should embrace greater exchange rate flexibility.  The Turkish crisis reinforced that view.  But worries 
that greater flexibility will impede market access, hinder financial development, and undermine rather 
than underpin financial stability have led others to advocate moving in the opposite direction -- that is, 
hardening the peg by installing a currency board or dollarizing.
2  While there are prominent examples of 
countries that have moved both ways -- Ecuador and El Salvador have dollarized while Brazil has 
embraced greater flexibility -- many developing countries continue to occupy the middle ground in the 
sense of making extensive use of their reserves so as to limit the variability of their exchange rates.
3 
The one thing all of these regimes have in common is that none is an entirely comfortable 
solution to the monetary dilemma.  Flexible rates tend to fluctuate erratically, especially if abandonment 
of a peg leaves a country without a nominal anchor, a clear and coherent monetary policy operating 
strategy, and credibility in the eyes of the markets.  Unilateral dollarization limits policy flexibility, gives 
the country resorting to it no voice in the monetary policy it runs, and sacrifices seigniorage revenues.  
And ad hoc intervention to limit the variability of the exchange rate in the absence of a credible 
commitment to a transparent, coherent, and defensible monetary strategy is unlikely to inspire 
                                                           
2I use the term “dollarization” generically to denote the adoption of a major (international) currency, be it the dollar, 
the euro or another unit. 
3Calvo and Reinhart (2000) are leading exponents of the view that many emerging markets exhibit “fear of floating” 
-- that, despite being reclassified by the IMF as embracing a greater degree of exchange rate flexibility, they continue to 




confidence; attempting to prevent the exchange rate from moving beyond set limits under these 
circumstances can render the central bank and its reserves sitting ducks for speculators.  That none of 
these options is particularly appealing is, if course, the dilemma of a world in which markets are 
international but governments are national.  It is why authors like Mundell (1997) and Cooper (1999) see 
a global currency and a global central bank as logical consequences of the globalization of markets.  
Notwithstanding this vision for the future, countries opening their economies to capital flows will 
be forced for the present to choose from this limited menu of hard pegs (currency boards, dollarization), 
implicit target zones (de jure floating but de facto intervention to limit the variability of the exchange rate), 
and greater flexibility.
4  Other authors have made the case for the first two options, what can be called hard 
and soft or loud and quiet pegs.
5  In this paper I consider the viability of the third.   
Calling for emerging markets to abandon the exchange rate as an anchor for policy compels those 
issuing the call to offer an alternative.
6  The leading candidate is inflation targeting.
7  The task I take on 
                                                           
4A further option, the adjustable peg, may be viable for countries with capital controls, as the experiences of China 
and Malaysia have shown.  I disregard this option here on the grounds that trends in technology and policy (domestic 
financial liberalization, in particular) will lead additional countries to liberalize their international financial transactions, 
limiting those to which this option is relevant. 
5On dollarization, see Hausmann (1999) and Calvo (2000a).  On bands and pegs for emerging markets, see 
Williamson (2000).  In order to reduce effective options to three, I lump together under the heading of “intermediate regimes” 
pegs, bands and crawls a la Williamson and implicit strategies to limit exchange rate flexibility a la Calvo and Reinhart 
(2000), since both are monetary policy strategies framed in terms of the level of the exchange rate, while neither hardens the 
peg to the extent of a currency board.  This follows the policy literature on target zones, which encompasses both hard and 
soft zones (that is, with and without buffers and escape clauses) and loud and quiet zones (in other words, those that are 
announced and unannounced). 
6Not all of the advocates of greater flexibility take this additional step.  Calvo (2000b) criticizes contributions to this 
literature, with no little justification, for failing to specify the alternative to an exchange-rate based policy regime. 
7Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Israel, the Czech Republic and Poland all adopted inflation targeting in conjunction with a 
recognition of the need to widen or abandon an exchange rate band.  Clearly, inflation targeting and flexible exchange rates 
are not synonymous, although, as Calvo (2000b, p.28) writes, there is a tendency to erroneously identify inflation targeting 
with flexible rates.  Flexible rates can be backed by no coherent monetary policy operating strategy of any kind or by a 
number of alternatives to inflation targeting.  The other options for policy are monetary targeting, which is impractical in 




in this paper is to assess whether inflation targeting offers a viable alternative to an exchange-rate based 
monetary policy regime. 
There has been some analysis of inflation targeting in emerging markets, most of it recent (the 
pioneering work is Masson, Savastano and Sharma 1997; see also Eichengreen, Masson, Savastano and 
Sharma 1999, Christoffersen and Wescott 1999, Mishkin 2000a, Mishkin and Savastano 2000, 
Bogdanski, Tombini and Werlang 2000, Devereux and Lane 2000, Jiri 2000, Morande 2000, and 
Schaechter, Stone and Zelmer 2000).  But none of these studies has considered the entire range of issues. 
 And most have failed to distinguish between open-economy and developing-country aspects of inflation 
targeting. 
I organize my discussion as follows.  Section 2 defines inflation targeting and reviews some 
conceptual issues relating to its implementation.  (Readers familiar with this literature may want to skip 
or skim this material.)  Section 3 then asks what is distinctive about inflation targeting in open 
economies.  Issues that arise under this heading include susceptibility to external shocks and the 
sensitivity of output and inflation to the exchange rate.  Section 4 then asks what is distinctive about 
inflation targeting in emerging markets.  Topics under this heading include passthrough, the difficulty of 
forecasting inflation, liability dollarization, and credibility issues. 
The conclusion then returns to question of whether inflation targeting is an option for emerging 
markets.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                  
policy targets, and nominal income targeting, which has formidable data requirements and has never been tried.  Another 




2.  General Considerations
8 
I define inflation targeting as a monetary policy operating strategy with four elements: an 
institutionalized commitment to price stability as the primary goal of monetary policy; mechanisms 
rendering the central bank accountable for attaining its monetary policy goals; the public announcement 
of targets for inflation; and a policy of communicating to the public and the markets the rationale for the 
decisions taken by the central bank.
9    Institutionalizing the commitment to price stability lends 
credibility to that objective and gives the central bank the independence needed to pursue it.   
Mechanisms for accountability make this pursuit politically acceptable and impose costs on central 
banks that are incompetent or behave opportunistically.  Announcing a target for inflation and 
articulating the basis for the central bank’s decisions allows these mechanisms to operate. 
The multi-dimensional nature of this definition explains why there is no consensus about which 
emerging markets are inflation targeters.  Brazil, Chile, the Czech Republic, Israel, South Africa, 
Poland, Colombia, Thailand, Mexico, the Philippines and South Korea are all cited in this connection.
10  
But while all of these countries have announced numerical targets for inflation, not all of them have put 
in place the other elements of inflation targeting as defined above.  At the time of writing, most 
observers would probably draw the line between the first and last six countries, classifying only the 
former as full-fledged inflation targeters.   
                                                           
8There exist more complete and authoritative surveys of the literature on inflation targeting than I am able to provide 
here, for example, Bernanke et al. (1999). 
9Others would add following an information-inclusive strategy where the variables to which the central bank 
responds are not limited to, say, current inflation and the output gap, and/or using an inflation forecast as the intermediate 
guide for monetary policy. 
10Such lists are constantly changing.  Thus, in June 2001 Hungary joined the inflation targeting club “implicitly,” 
while Thailand, according to some, backed away from full-fledged inflation targeting by embracing a more exchange-rate 




One can further distinguish “strict” inflation targeting from “flexible” inflation targeting.  Strict 
inflation targeting is when only inflation enters the central bank’s objective function, flexible inflation 
targeting when there is also a positive weight on other variables, output for example (Svensson 1999).  
(Even with strict inflation targeting there is still a positive weight on output in the policy reaction 
function insofar as the information content of the output gap is useful for forecasting inflation.
11)  Since 
few central banks and polities are prepared to disregard all other variables under all circumstances, 
flexible inflation targeting is the policy-relevant case.
12   
This has a number of implications.  Most obviously, whereas a central bank that targets inflation 
strictly will attempt to hit that target as quickly as possible under all circumstances (where the feasible 
speed depends on the control lag from its policy instruments to inflation), a central bank that pursues 
flexible inflation targeting will tend to push inflation toward its target more gradually.  It will balance 
the benefits of minimizing the variability of inflation against the costs of creating additional variability 
in the other variables that enter its objective function.  
So defined, inflation targeting is a “target rule,” where policy is formulated to hit an 
appropriately weighted set of ex ante specified policy objectives.  The question is how to move from a 
target rule to an “instrument rule” -- that is, settings for the policy instrument or instruments as a 
function of the information available to policy makers.
13  This is not straightforward in a complex 
                                                           
11I show this below using a simple model.  De Brouwer and O’Regan (1997) also show this using a simulation model 
that inflation targeting which ignores the information content of output deviations results in not just more variable output but 
more variable inflation as well. 
12Calvo (2000b, p.28) asserts that “Inflation targeting is equivalent to pegging the currency to a basket of goods.”  
This is true of strict inflation targeting but not of its flexible counterpart. 
13The language here is from Svensson (1999).  Other authors refer to this as the distinction between policy objectives 





14  Three imperfect solutions are to fly by the seat of the central bank’s pants, inflation-forecast 
targeting, and the Taylor rule.  I consider these alternatives in turn. 
Seat-of-the-pants inflation targeting (using everything from in-house econometric models to 
central banker’s intuition to guide the setting of policy instruments) is what many central banks do -- 
some with considerable success.  But it is unlikely to be efficient insofar as it is not systematized.  And 
to the extent that the rationale for the central bank’s decision cannot be fully articulated and defended, it 
will lack credibility.
15 
Targeting the central bank’s inflation forecast (conditional on the information available at the 
time of the forecast) is an example of an “intermediate targeting rule” that specifies a vector of 
intermediate targets that are correlated with the ultimate policy goal but easier to control and observe 
than the ultimate goal (Svensson 1999).  Inflation forecast targeting should be more efficient than 
formulating policy on the basis of an ad hoc reaction function insofar as the policy instruments respond 
to all the information that is relevant to the forecast.  It will have more credibility than the alternatives if 
the central bank has a track record of accurate forecasting.
16    
                                                           
14And where outcomes are uncertain.  There is a growing literature on inflation targeting under uncertainty (for 
example, Levin, Weiland and Williams 1999, Kumhof 2000), which I leave aside in this paper.   
15Something that is likely to be particularly problematic in emerging markets, as I analyze below. 
16This is another big if, and it is something that is likely to be especially problematic in emerging markets (as I 
discuss below).  In addition, simply targeting the inflation forecast does not solve the problem that additional information 
about the structure of the economy and its reaction to policy is needed to inform the central bank’s decision of how quickly to 




That seat-of-the-pants inflation targeting is arbitrary and that inflation-forecast targeting is no 
more reliable than the forecast have motivated the search for simple rules.  The Taylor rule is the leading 
example.  Taylor (1993) specifies a reaction function for a closed economy with positive weights on 
deviations from target inflation and from the natural rate of unemployment that closely tracks the actual 
policies followed by many central banks that target low inflation.  Contributors to the closed-economy 
literature have shown how a Taylor rule can be derived as the optimal reaction function for a strictly 
inflation-targeting central bank.  Let the economy be represented as: 
 
πτ+1 = πτ + α(yt - y*) + εt+1                                                                                        (1) 
yt+1 - y*  = λ(yt - y*) - β(rt - r*) + nt+1                                                                        (2) 
 
Equation (1) is an accelerationist Phillips Curve, where the change in inflation (π) between this period 
and next is a function of this period’s gap between actual output (y) and its natural level (y*) and of a 
disturbance (denoted ε t+1).  Equation (2) is aggregate demand, where next period’s output gap is a 
function of this period’s output gap, the deviation of the interest rate (r) from normal (r*), and a 
disturbance (nt+1).  The key assumption is that the control lag until inflation responds to the central 
bank’s instrument (r) is longer than the control lag for aggregate demand (equivalently in the present 
context, that policy affects inflation only through the aggregate-demand channel). 
Under strict inflation targeting, the optimal policy is to target inflation two periods ahead, setting 
π t+2 =  π∗, where π∗ denotes target inflation.  (Inflation one period ahead is given by output in the 




solve for the optimal reaction function, shift equation (1) forward, substitute in (2), and set πt+2 (the two-
year inflation forecast) equal to π∗ (thus adopting a version of inflation-forecast targeting).  This yields: 
 
rt  = r* + φ(πt - π∗) + χ(yt - y*)                                                                         (3) 
 
This is a Taylor rule with positive weights on deviations of inflation from target and of output 
from its natural rate, where the weights φ and χ depend on the parameters α, λ, and β.  We see the point 
mentioned above, that even under strict inflation targeting there is still a positive weight on output in the 
reaction function because of its information content for future inflation. 
However, equation (3) is a peculiar Taylor rule.  Strict inflation targeting implies sharp changes 
in the interest rate in response to deviations of inflation from target and output from its natural level, 
since φ = 1/(αβ) and χ  = (1+λ)/β.
17  For example, if λ=0.8, α=0.4, and β=0.6, values that approximate 
realistic conditions, then we would observe changes in the interest rate in response deviations to both 
variables of several times the magnitude suggested by Taylor as matching the actual behavior of central 
banks.
18  This in turn implies very considerable output fluctuations.  It is worth emphasizing that we 
obtain this solution only because we are assuming that the central bank cares exclusively about inflation 
to the total disregard of output.  This is a further indication, if one was needed, that central banks are 
not strict inflation targeters; they care also about the behavior of other variables. 
                                                           
17In the general case where the central bank cares not just about inflation but also about other variables like 
output, the reaction coefficients will also depend on the parameters of its objective function (see below).  But that is not 
the case here. 
18Taylor identifies φ=1.5 and χ=0.5 as replicating the actual behavior of inflation-targeting central banks.  Here 
we get φ≅4 and χ=3.  
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If it cares about the deviations of output from the natural rate as well as deviations of 
inflation from target, then an optimizing central bank, instead of adjusting two-year-ahead expected 
inflation all the way to the inflation target, will adjust it part way: 
 
E(πτ+2) = κπ∗ + (1-κ)E(πτ+1)                                                                            (4) 
 
where κ is a constant between zero and one, and E denotes an expectation.  Svensson (1996) derives 
this relationship in the present model and shows that κ will be a decreasing function of the weight on 
output stabilization in the central bank’s objective function.
19  
Life is more complicated if the structure of the economy is more complex -- for example, if 
the economy is open.  It is to the complications that arise in the case of open-economy inflation 
targeting that I now turn. 
 
                                                           
19Similarly, the higher the central bank’s discount rate (the more it cares about the present relative to the future) 
and the less responsive is inflation to output fluctuations (the smaller α), the less will be the weight on target inflation.  If 
inflation two periods ahead is of less concern (because the discount rate is higher), then the central bank will be prepared 
to incur less output variability in order to stabilize it.  And if output has to be pushed around a lot in order to hit the 
inflation target, then the weight on that target in the reaction function will be less.  These relationships are easy to show 
for shocks to εt when the control lag from the policy instrument to inflation is only one period -- if we rewrite equation 
(2) as yt - y*  = - β(rt - r*) + nt) for example, so that the interest rate affects output immediately but inflation only with a 
one period lag -- but harder to show in the model in the text (again, however, see Svensson 1996).  In contrast to the 
response to shocks to ε, in the variant in this footnote the interest rate is adjusted immediately in response to shocks to 
aggregate demand (to nt), so as to return both inflation to target and output instantaneously to the natural rate; equation 
(4) in the text is irrelevant.  
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2.  What’s Different About Open Economies? 
The openness of emerging markets raises obvious questions about the relevance of the simple 
closed-economy inflation targeting framework.  Openness exposes the economy to foreign shocks to 
both commodity and financial markets and introduces additional channels for policy.  For example, 
the central bank’s policy instrument (r) will now affect output not just directly, as in equation (2), but 
also indirectly through its impact on the exchange rate.  While the direct interest-rate channel will 
dampen investment, as in a closed economy, the indirect channel will reduce net export demand by 
appreciating the exchange rate.  This is easiest to see by starting from the interest parity condition 
that will hold in a financially open economy: 
 
et  - E(et+1)  =  rt - r’ + νt                                                                                               (5) 
where the exchange rate e is defined as the foreign price of domestic currency (an increase is an 
appreciation), r’ is the foreign interest rate, and ν is a financial market (or “pure portfolio”) 
disturbance.
20  Ball (1999) and Mishkin and Savastano (2000) consider a simplified version of this 
relationship where the expected future exchange rate is constant (so that et = rt - r’ + νt).
21  For 
convenience, I adopt this simplification in what follows. The additional impact of the interest rate on 
output, operating through the exchange rate, then implies nothing more than a larger coefficient on 
                                                           
20This is a “pure portfolio disturbance” in the sense that it appears only in this condition for financial market 
equilibrium, not also in the aggregate demand equation.  Later in the paper I introduce an international commodity 
market (or “export market”) disturbance that affects financial and commodity markets simultaneously.  The implications 
for policy turn out to be rather different. 
21One can attempt to justify this by arguing that since the expected values of the disturbances to equations (1) 
and (2) are zero, the exchange rate is expected to return to its (constant) level in the long run.  But this ignores the 
distinction between temporary and permanent disturbances and between the long-run equilibrium level and the level one 
period out.  
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the domestic interest rate in equation (2).  Since it is assumed (for the time being) that the exchange 
rate and the interest rate affect the change in output with the same lag, (2) can be written as: 
 
 yt+1 - y*  = λ(yt - y*) - β(rt - r*) - δet + nt+1                                                           (2') 
 
Note that β(rt - r*) + δet = (β + δ)rt  - βr*.  In open economies where the output response is larger, 
adjustments in the policy instruments will  be smaller.  But the reaction function is otherwise 
unchanged. 
The implications are more complex if exchange rate movements also affect inflation directly 
with the same one-period lag as it is affected by the output gap.
22  In other words, we rewrite 
equation (1) as: 
 
 
 πτ+1 = πτ + α(yt - y*) - γ(et - et-1) + εt                                                                    (1') 
 
 
Strict inflation targeting is the simple case as always.  Now a central bank that wishes to hit its 
inflation target in t+1 and not just t+2 can do so.  It does this by using its instrument (the interest 
rate) to alter the exchange rate and hence import prices.  But output is more variable than before, 
                                                           
22In the model of the previous section, the policy instrument could affect inflation only after two periods, since 
there was a one-period lag from policy to the output gap and a further one-period lag from the output gap to inflation.  
Ted Truman has raised the question (in private correspondence) of whether there is strong empirical support for this 
assumption that the impact of monetary policy on inflation is felt faster in open economies.    
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since the interest rate is no longer adjusted to push output back toward its natural level (that having 
been the only channel, in the closed economy, through which policy could affect inflation in the 
event of an aggregate demand shock).  Thus, strict inflation targeting that puts a high weight on 
inflation stability will result in more output instability in an open economy.
23   
Intuition suggests that when the central bank values the stability of both inflation and output, 
the ratio of the two reaction function coefficients (the response to inflation deviations relative to the 
response to output deviations, that is, the ratio φ to χ in equation 3 above) will be smaller in more 
open economies.
24  In terms of equation (4), the central bank will move more slowly to restore 
inflation to its target level (κ will be smaller).  Because the policy instrument, operating through the 
exchange rate, has a more powerful first-period effect on inflation, tending to destabilize output as 
well as stabilizing inflation, policy is used more moderately in response to a given ratio of deviations 
of inflation to deviations in output.  
An open economy is susceptible to shocks emanating from international commodity and 
financial markets.  Although both types of shocks will affect the exchange rate, the appropriate 
policy response by an inflation-targeting central bank will depend on the source.  Consider first a 
shock emanating from financial markets -- a change in the direction or availability of capital flows 
                                                           
23Note that it is current account openness as well as financial openness that matters for this conclusion. 
24While a closed-form solution demonstrating this result is not available, Ball (1999, pp.132-133) obtains it in a 
simulation of the present model.  Gomez (2000) conducts analogous exercises using the more elaborate model in 
Svensson (2000).  For flexible CPI inflation targeting (the case relevant to the present discussion), he obtains this result 
over most of the relevant range: as the share of imported goods in the CPI rises from, say, 10 to 50 per cent, the reaction 
to innovations in domestic inflation declines relative to the reaction to output innovations.  However, as openness begins 
to rise from very low levels, the reaction to inflation innovations falls relative to the reaction to output innovations.  Since 
an increase in the share of imported goods affects several parameters of Svensson’s model (notably the effects of both the 
exchange rate and the output gap on inflation and effect of the exchange rate in the Phillips Curve) in interdependent 
nonlinear ways, it is not surprising that the change in the ratio of the two reaction function coefficients is not the same 
over the entire range of possible values for openness.  
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due to, say, a rise in world interest rates (or a deterioration in foreign investor sentiment toward the 
country).  I refer to this in what follows as “Calvo shock.”
25  This can be modeled as an increase in r’ 
(or as a low realization of ν).  A higher foreign interest rate implies less capital inflow for a given 
domestic interest rate and therefore a weaker currency, ceteris paribus.  As the exchange rate 
weakens, higher import prices are passed through into inflation.
26  The optimal response is then to 
raise interest rates.  
Note that this encourages “fear-of-floating” type behavior by an inflation targeting central 
bank (although the exchange rate may still be considerably more flexible than if it is pegged).  If a 
Calvo shock displaces the exchange rate, then the interest rate adjustments that offset the inflationary 
consequences have the effect of moderating the change in the value of the currency (of bringing the 
exchange rate back toward its previous level).  If the currency weakens, the central bank raises 
interest rates, which strengthens it, ceteris paribus.  If it strengthens, the central bank reduces rates, 
which weakens it, other things equal.  This is not because the central bank cares about the exchange 
rate in and of itself but because it cares about inflation. 
However, while a central bank confronted by a Calvo shock will raise interest rates in order 
to moderate the depreciation of the currency, it will not prevent the exchange rate from moving, as 
the strong “fear of floating” view would suggest.  Higher interest rates imply weaker domestic 
demand in the new long-run equilibrium, and that decline in domestic demand will have to be offset 
                                                           
25Guillermo Calvo having emphasized the impact of capital-flow-related shocks to emerging markets. 
26The weaker exchange rate also implies future inflation insofar as it boosts export demand, but this is a 
secondary effect.  That a decline in capital inflows would raise aggregate demand seems peculiar; it is a figment of the 
present thought experiment because the domestic interest rate (the other main determinant of aggregate demand) is held 
constant.  The paradox is dissolved by the next sentence in the text.  
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by additional export demand created by a weaker exchange rate.  Thus, while the degree of exchange 
rate flexibility will be limited by central bank policy, such flexibility will not be eliminated entirely.  
The currency will still exhibit greater flexibility than when it is pegged.The intuition that central 
banks concerned about future inflation should adjust the interest rate to counter fluctuations in the 
exchange rate has been formalized as the idea of a “monetary conditions index.”  The MCI, which 
indicates the overall stance of policy, is a weighted average of the interest rate and the exchange rate 
(since these two variables are linked by equation 5) where the former is adjusted to offset finance-
induced fluctuations in the latter.
27  Using a simulation model of the New Zealand economy, Hunt 
(1999) shows that when the main source of shocks is from international financial markets to the 
exchange rate, it will be desirable to target an MCI which includes both the interest rate and the 
exchange rate (raising interest rates when the exchange rate weakens, other things equal). 
What if the shock is temporary? A transitory shock to ν that depreciates the exchange rate 
will still dictate a limited rise in interest rates to damp down future demand-induced inflation.
28  But 
because the direct impact on inflation through higher import prices is transitory, responding to it with 
sharply higher interest rates will only amplify the volatility of output and inflation, since ν, and with 
it underlying inflationary pressures, will have returned to normal in the next period.  Interest rates 
                                                           
27Freedman (1994) has suggested that the weights in the composite indicator made up of the interest rate and the 
exchange rate (the “monetary conditions indicator”) should be proportional to the coefficients on e and r in the Phillips 
Curve (equation 2' above).  That is, they should be proportional to the parameters β and δ above.  For representative 
parameter values, this means that when the exchange rate depreciates by 1 per cent, holding everything else constant, the 
interest rate has to be raised by some 30 basis points to damp down growth and the domestic inflation that it provokes.  
(In constructing this example I assume that it is the log exchange rate but the level of the interest rate that enter equation 
2'.)  In reality, the optimal response depends on more than simply these two parameters, as should now be clear, but Ball 
(1999) shows that Freedman’s intuition is basically correct: that the weights coefficients are likely to be fairly close to the 
ratio of coefficients on the exchange rate and the interest rate in the Phillips curve. 
28Under the assumption that even temporary shocks to the foreign exchange market have persistent output 
effects, as will be the case given the structure of equation 2'.  
         18 
 
should be hiked to damp down only the domestic component of inflation (which derives from the 
persistent increase in aggregate demand), but not also the contribution of imported inflation (which is 
temporary).  Responding this period to a problem that will have disappeared by next period, using an 
instrument that takes one period to work, will only produce cycles of output and inflation.  
In Ball’s (1999) model, the implication is that the monetary conditions indicator (the 
weighted average of the interest rate and the exchange rate) should be adjusted not to movements in 
πt but to movements in πt + γ(et  - et-1), where γ is the response of inflation to a change in the 
exchange rate.  In other words, the authorities should target domestic inflation and not CPI inflation. 
 Bharucha and Kent (1998) use a simulation model of Australia to show that responding only to the 
domestic component of inflation (and not also to imported inflation) delivers better results when 
shocks to the exchange rate are temporary.
29  Since the interest rate response to movements in the 
exchange rate will be less, fear-of-floating type behavior will be less when capital market shocks are 
temporary.
30 
All this rests on the assumption that the source of disturbances is international financial 
markets.  Assume instead that the disturbance is to the foreign component of aggregate demand (to 
the terms of trade or to export demand).  I refer to this as a “Prebisch shock.”  The exchange rate will 
                                                           
29Ryan and Thompson (2000) suggest that it may not be necessary to explicitly target the domestic price index if 
the CPI target is defined as an interval rather than a point.  They argue that Australia’s monetary policy framework deals 
with this problem by permitting relatively small divergences from the 2-3 per cent target band over the cycle “provided 
inflation is forecast to be back within 2-3 per cent in the medium term.  The forward-looking nature of policy should also 
be sufficient to prevent the RBA from responding to exchange rate shocks which are only expected to have a temporary 
effect on inflation” (p.2). 
30It may seem peculiar that the central bank will intervene less to neutralize transitory shocks to the foreign 
exchange market (which standard efficiency arguments suggest it might want to obviate) than in response to long-lived 
shocks.  The result reflects the existence of control lags between monetary policy on the one hand and inflation and 
output on the other; in this setup, responding as vigorously to a purely temporary shock as to a permanent shock just 
destabilizes the target variables.  
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again weaken, since export revenues will have declined while nothing else affecting the foreign 
exchange market will have changed in the first instance.  In addition, aggregate demand will weaken, 
since foreigners are demanding fewer of the country’s exports.
31  Now there are two offsetting effects 
on inflation: while higher import prices will be passed through into inflation, weaker aggregate 
demand will be deflationary.   
In the real world the first effect is likely to dominate.
32  If the central bank attaches a high 
weight to output variability, it may still hesitate to raise interest rates, knowing that inflation will 
decline subsequently due to the weakness of output.  If, as is more typically the case, it attaches a 
high weight to deviations of inflation from target, it will raise interest rates to limit currency 
depreciation in the short run, while still allowing the exchange rate to adjust eventually to its new 
long-run equilibrium level.  While it will lean against the wind, it will not prevent the exchange rate 
from moving.  It will not display fear of floating in this strong sense.  
                                                           
31We can model this by adding the commodity market disturbance µ to the exchange-rate and aggregate-demand 
relationships (5) and (2').  The former becomes: 
 
et  - E(et+1)  =  rt - r’ + νt  + µt                                                                                 (5') 
 
while the latter becomes: 
 
 yt+1 - y*  = λ(yt - y*) - β(rt - r*) - δet + ξµt  + nt+1                                                   (2") 
 
where ξ is a parameter linking the terms-of-trade shock to aggregate demand.  (The export-demand shock is assumed to 
affect output with the same lag as movements in the exchange rate emanating from other sources.) 
32Otherwise, inflation will decline with the growth in the gap between potential and current output.  The 
appropriate response for an inflation-targeting central bank is to cut interest rates, regardless of the weight it attaches to 
output variability.  Now central bank behavior will not resemble fear of floating.  To the contrary, the cut in interest rates 
will accentuate the change in the value of the currency.  Because the decline in foreign demand requires a weaker 
exchange rate in order to stabilize output (and because the cut in demand also subdues inflation), the central bank does 
nothing to limit the adjustment of the exchange rate; to the contrary, it encourages it to adjust.  
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Note that the monetary conditions indicator now sends the wrong signal in response to this 
shock.  It suggests raising interest rates to counter the weakness of the exchange rate, where the 
appropriate response is to allow the exchange rate to move down to a lower long-run equilibrium 
level to offset the negative real shock.   Mishkin (2000) cites cases (such as New Zealand in 1997 
and Chile in 1998) where the central bank either utilized a monetary conditions indicator or 
attempted to limit the variability of the exchange rate as part of its inflation targeting regime, 
inducing precisely the wrong response to a shock to external demand (tightening when the economy 
was weakening). 
To summarize, inflation targeting is more complicated in open economies, reflecting the 
additional shocks to which such economies are exposed and the additional channels linking policy 
instruments and outcomes.  Insofar as policy has more powerful effects when it operates through the 
exchange rate as well as the interest rate, this implies, other things equal, that policy instruments 
should be adjusted less in response to the same shocks.  Insofar as the additional exchange rate 
channel linking interest rates to inflation changes the structure of policy lags,  openness also requires 
rethinking the relative weights on inflation and output in the reaction function.  In general, the central 
bank of an open economy will respond less to inflation deviations relative to output deviations, since 
monetary policy, which also operates through the exchange rate, now has a more powerful, 
immediate effect on inflation. 
Will open-economy inflation targeters exhibit “fear of floating?”  In general, an inflation 
targeting central bank will let the exchange rate adjust, although it may wish to smooth its 
movement.  It will lean against the exchange rate change in response to shocks.  If the exchange rate 
depreciates, it will raise the interest rate.  But it will not prevent the exchange rate from adjusting to a  
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new long-run equilibrium level.  It will not display fear of floating in this strong sense. 
 
3.  What’s Different About Emerging Markets? 
What is different about emerging markets is the speed of passthrough, the difficulty of 
forecasting inflation,  liability dollarization, and credibility issues. 
A.  Higher Passthrough 
Calvo and Reinhart provide evidence that changes in import prices due to movements in the 
exchange rate are passed through into domestic prices faster in emerging markets than industrial 
countries.  A history of inflation may have raised agents’ awareness of and sensitivity to imported 
inflation and led to formal indexation. The commitment to price stability may lack credibility; hence, 
it may be feared that transitory shocks leading to depreciation of the exchange rate will be validated 
by policy and hence become permanent.
33 
Faster passthrough can be formalized as a larger γ and a smaller (absolute value of) δ in 
equation (1').  With high passthrough, a change in the exchange rate has a large short-run impact on 
inflation and a small short-run impact on output.  If there is a shock to the foreign exchange market 
(a negative Prebisch shock, for example, that causes the rate to depreciate and output to fall), the 
authorities will have less reluctance to tighten than in the case of slower passthrough, since they gain 
more in terms of disinflation as the currency stabilizes and strengthens, while losing less as output 
falls due to declining competitiveness. 
But the preceding paragraph makes clear that passthrough is not an exogenous parameter that 
                                                           
33The sources and further implications of limited credibility are left to Subsection D below.  
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can be regarded as independent of the monetary regime.  If the credibility of the commitment to low 
inflation is enhanced by an institutionalized commitment to price stability, central bank 
independence and accountability, and policies of communicating the rationale for monetary-policy 
decisions, then agents will revise downward the likelihood they attach to the prospect that transitory 
shocks will be validated by policy and hence become permanent, and therefore how quickly they 
adjust prices in response to a weaker exchange rate.
34 
Under full (instantaneous, 100 per cent) indexation, monetary policy has no capacity to 
stabilize -- or, for that matter, destabilize -- output.
35  It can simply be used to target inflation.  With 
full indexation, that target can be hit immediately.
36  Full indexation thus simplifies the inflation 
targeting problem since it reduces the central bank’s objective function to the one variable that it can 
now influence and allows the authorities to hit that target immediately.
37 
The implications for exchange rate management depend on the source of shocks.  If domestic 
monetary policy is the source of the instability, then stabilizing the exchange rate will force the 
central bank to undo such shocks immediately.  If shocks are external, then the exchange rate should 
adjusted to offset them.  Foreign deflation will induce an inflation-targeting central bank to expand 
the money supply and allow the currency to depreciate, while an inflationary shock will induce the 
                                                           
34There is some anecdotal evidence of this for Brazil and Mexico (Mishkin and Savastano 2000) and Israel 
(Leiderman and Bufman 2001). 
35See Sachs (1980). 
36This is note to say that central bankers in fully indexed economies have necessarily had particular success in 
hitting that target, especially in those countries where fiscal deficits are chronic and central bank independence is limited. 
37This is just the limiting case of the thought experiment described at the beginning of the previous paragraph.  
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opposite reaction.
38  Thus, while rapid passthrough will modify the implementation of monetary 
policy by an inflation targeting central bank, it is not a fundamental challenge to the viability of that 
approach to its formulation. 
       B.  Difficulty of Forecasting Inflation 
Disturbances make it difficult for observers to evaluate the central bank’s commitment to 
inflation targeting, since it is often hard to determine the extent to which divergences between actual 
inflation and the target are due to the monetary policy implemented several quarters ago as opposed 
to shocks occurring during the control lag.  This uncertainty may reduce credibility -- it will not be 
clear whether the central bank is in fact following the announced policy.
39  This is where the 
conditional inflation forecast comes in.
40  The central bank announces a point or range forecast for 
inflation and explains how its instrument settings are consistent with its forecast.  If it misses the 
target, it must then be able to point to unanticipated disturbances occurring during the control lag that 
can account for the discrepancy or risk losing credibility.  
If reliable forecasting is not possible, then the markets may be unable to determine the intent 
of the authorities.  A brutally-honest central bank might surround its point forecast with a wide 
confidence interval.  But a wide range of outcomes will be consistent with a wide range of policies, 
complicating efforts to determine the authorities’ intent.  Nor will specifying a narrow forecast range 
and missing it repeatedly build confidence in the central bank’s commitment to its target. 
                                                           
38We are in what Calvo (2000b) refers to as the world of the traditional model. 
39See below. 
40As noted above, this can be interpreted as minimizing the loss function using all the relevant information.  This 
should be the central bank’s internal forecast and not a market forecast to avoid problems of multiple equilibria.  
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Forecasts based on historical relationships can be invalidated when there is a change in the 
policy process -- that is to say, a change in the monetary regime.  And what is the adoption of formal 
inflation targeting but a change in regime?  Thus, the problem of forecasting inflation in the early 
phases of the new regime is general, not specific to emerging markets.  But there are reasons to 
worry that it is especially difficult there.  Emerging markets attracted to inflation targeting will 
typically be bringing down inflation from high levels.  Thus, the change in regime is likely to be 
particular sharp and inflation volatility particularly pronounced during the transition.  Passthrough 
may change.  De-indexation will be proceeding with uncertain consequences.  The shift from an 
alternative monetary policy operating strategy to inflation targeting will be part of a package of 
stabilization measures, typically including structural reforms of the public and private sectors that 
transform the inflation process in unpredictable ways.  If the country is emerging from a period of 
strict central planning, price controls may be in the process of elimination, and there may be the 
prospect of sharp changes in excise taxes to augment public-sector revenues and enhance the 
efficiency of tax collection. 
While these are reasons why inflation forecasting may be especially difficult during the 
transition, they do not obviously challenge its feasibility once the aforementioned structural and 
policy reforms have been put in place.  Revealingly, those emerging markets that have adopted full-
fledged inflation targeting have not generally started from a position of high inflation; rather, they 
have first brought inflation down to moderate levels and pursued other reforms before installing the 
new regime.
41 
                                                           
41The point applies to Brazil, for example, which had considerable success in moderating inflation between 1994 
and 1998.  
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But are there also structural features of emerging markets that complicate the forecasting 
exercise even once these reforms are complete?  Emerging economies are more commodity-price 
sensitive than their advanced-industrial counterparts, and commodity-price fluctuations can wreak 
havoc with the forecastability of consumer price inflation.  There is the fact that foodstuffs, whose 
prices are affected by the weather, have a heavy weight in the CPI in low-income countries.  The 
obvious solution to both problems is to target “core” (or underlying) inflation net of commodity 
prices, as is the practice of some industrial countries.
42  
Then there is such countries’ disproportionate dependence on capital flows.  Sensitivity of 
domestic financial conditions to international capital flows is, in a sense, the defining feature of an 
emerging market.  The literature on asymmetric information suggests that unpredictable volatility is 
especially pronounced in the financial sphere, and nowhere more than in international financial 
markets.  Because information is costly to acquire and process, investors are imperfectly informed.  
They therefore herd in and out of markets in response to the movements of other investors, 
amplifying volatility.  Because asymmetric information reduces the liquidity of financial assets in 
periods of distress (reflecting fears that assets liquidated in fire sales are damaged goods), illiquidity 
and balance-sheet problems may transmit financial difficulties across borders, with destabilizing 
repercussions for innocent bystanders.
43  These phenomena will be most pronounced in international 
markets, where information must travel geographical and cultural distance, and in emerging markets, 
where the information environment is least developed. 
The forecastability of inflation, ultimately, is an empirical issue.  Hoffmaister (1999) has 
                                                           
42There are likely to be credibility issues here as well.  Again I defer these to a subsequent subsection.  
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analyzed it in South Korea, finding that inflation is roughly as forecastable there as in Sweden.  
Univariate models of inflation perform similarly in Korea and in the high-income inflation targeters 
in the period immediately preceding their adoption of the strategy, although there is some evidence 
of positive kurtosis, as if inflation is subject more frequently to larger shocks than would be expected 
given its standard deviation.  Christoffersen and Wescott (1999) and Rivas (2001) similarly find 
evidence of kurtosis and skewness for Poland in 1992-98 and Nicaragua in 1988-98, respectively.  
But upon eliminating some of the largest and smallest price changes each month among the 33 main 
categories in Poland’s CPI to derive a measure of core inflation, Christoffersen and Wescott find that 
a limited set of economic variables forecasts one-period-ahead core inflation reasonably well by 
international standards.
44  Rivas similarly has considerable success in forecasting core inflation in 
Nicaragua so long as he focuses on the period of moderate inflation starting around 1993. 
Thus, the difficulty of forecasting inflation may be an obstacle to effective inflation targeting 
in an economy in economic and financial disequilibrium.  It is not realistic to hope to forecast 
inflation with the requisite reliability if the country is still bringing inflation down from high levels, 
comprehensively reforming the tax and public-spending systems, and radically restructuring the 
private sector.  But where such reforms have been underway for some time and are proceeding at a 
measured pace -- as in Poland, South Korea and Brazil -- forecasting difficulties would not appear to 
be an insurmountable obstacle to inflation targeting. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
43The now extensive literature on contagion is concerned with this point. 
44Since their measure of core inflation is constructed transparently, this should be something that private agents 
are able to replicate.  
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C.  Liability Dollarization 
In many emerging markets, the obligations of banks, corporations and governments -- their 
foreign obligations in particular -- are denominated in foreign currency, while their revenues are 
domestic-currency denominated to a considerable extent.  Insofar as banks and other intermediaries 
close their open foreign-currency positions by issuing dollar-denominated loans, they will simply 
pass on that problem of liability dollarization to their customers.  When the exchange rate 
depreciates, their balance sheets will still suffer, and this “financial accelerator” will depress output 
and employment. 
    The simplest way of thinking about liability dollarization is as reducing δ, the positive 
response of output to currency depreciation in equation (2').  While depreciation renders domestic 
goods more competitive, as before, it now also weakens the balance sheets of banks, firms, 
households and governments, depressing consumption and investment.  The second effect partially 
offsets the first.
45 
Consider the response to a Calvo shock, compared to the benchmark case analyzed in Section 
2.  Weaker consumption and investment due to adverse balance-sheet effects now imply less 
inflation in the intermediate run than before.  An inflation-targeting central bank will therefore feel 
less compelled to raise interest rates in order to push up the exchange rate and damp down the 
increase in import prices.
46  If the shock to the exchange rate instead emanates from commodity 
markets (a negative Prebisch shock), higher import prices will still be passed through into inflation, 
                                                           
45It turns out that this is not precisely what those concerned with the perverse effect of exchange rate changes in 
the presence of liability dollarization have in mind, as I explain momentarily. 
46We can also see this from Freedman’s formulation of the monetary conditions indicator and from Ball’s model, 
where the weight on the exchange rate in the MEI declines with δ.  
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but now aggregate demand will be weaker than before because of the adverse balance-sheet effects.  
Since output is lower and inflation is no higher than in the absence of liability dollarization, again 
there will be less pressure to hike interest rates in order to stabilize the currency and damp down 
inflation, and more incentive to cut interest rates to stimulate production (compared to the situation 
where balance-sheet effects are absent).  This suggests that, regardless of the source of shocks, “fear 
of floating” will be less in the presence of liability dollarization.
47   
While this may seem counterintuitive, it is simply an illustration of the general point that 
when the central bank worries more about variables other than inflation, either because of a heavier 
weight on those variables in its objective function, or because the parameters of the model cause 
those other variables to be displaced further from their equilibrium levels (where the latter is the case 
presently under discussion), it will move more gradually to eliminate discrepancies between actual 
and target inflation.  Because the exchange rate must move more to increase output and employment, 
and because measures which would limit its fluctuation and thereby reduce imported inflation tend to 
destabilize the real economy, the now weaker tendency for depreciation to stimulate activity means 
that the central bank will do even less to limit depreciation.   
The same is true when the problem in the financial system is maturity mismatches rather than 
currency mismatches.  (This can be modeled as an increase in the coefficient β in the aggregate 
demand equation.)  Again, the more the central bank fears that an interest rate hike designed to damp 
down inflation will cause financial distress (because the maturity of banks’ liabilities is shorter than 
their assets, or because higher interest rates will increase default rates among bank borrowers), the 
                                                           
47This is therefore what Cepedes, Chang and Velasco (2001), find in their simulation model of optimal monetary 
policies in the presence of liability dollarization.  
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less it will raise interest rates in the intermediate run to strengthen the exchange rate and limit 
inflation. 
    Clearly, those who argue that liability dollarization creates fear of floating have something 
else in mind, presumably that the balance-sheet effects of currency depreciation are so strong that 
they turn δ negative.  Let -δ > β, so that a cut in the interest rate which weakens the exchange rate 
depresses output on balance.  This constellation of parameter values is extreme (and it has some 
peculiar implications, as we will see momentarily), but it would appear to be what the Cassandras of 
liability dollarization have in mind. 
As before, a negative Calvo shock fuels inflation through higher import prices.  It also now 
lowers output through the adverse balance-sheet effect.  The appropriate response, which damps 
down inflation and stabilizes output by limiting balance-sheet damage, is to raise interest rates and 
push the exchange rate back up to its pre-shock level.
48  “Fear-of-floating” type behavior results.   If 
the disturbance is instead a Prebisch shock, the weaker exchange rate again means more imported 
inflation and lower levels of output.  (The decline in output is even larger than in the comparable 
thought experiment in Section 2 because the direct effect of the decline in foreign demand is 
reinforced by the indirect effect of exchange rate depreciation via its adverse impact on balance 
sheets.)  Again, interest rate hikes are the appropriate response to both problems, since a higher 
interest rate which strengthens the exchange rate not only damps down inflation but also strengthens 
balance sheets.  Again, the central bank will not hesitate to raise interest rates.  Again, its response 
will resemble fear of floating. 
                                                           
48Here it is important to interpret e as the real exchange rate and r as the real interest rate, since even temporary 
depreciation will lead to inflation and a higher price level, whose implications for the real exchange rate are otherwise  
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This formulation has some peculiar implications, as already noted.  For one, a negative shock 
that reduces export demand and depresses output must be offset in the new long-run equilibrium by 
an appreciated exchange rate, not a depreciated one.
49  In this peculiar world, overvaluation is good 
for output because its favorable financial effects dominate its adverse competitiveness effects.  It can 
be reasonably objected that this is unrealistic -- that it is implausible to assume that -δ > β.  But 
relaxing this assumption means we are back in a world not just where the authorities allow the 
exchange rate to adjust to a new lower level following an adverse Prebisch shock but also where they 
do not jack up interest rates to significantly slow its movement.  In other words, we are back in the 
world where they display “fear of fixing” rather than “fear of floating.”   
A possible reconciliation is that when the exchange rate depreciates by a large amount, the 
adverse balance-sheet effects dominate, but when it depreciates by a small amount, the favorable 
competitiveness effects dominate.  Large depreciations cause severe financial distress because they 
confront banks and firms with asset prices for which they are unprepared, while doing little to 
enhance competitiveness because of the speed with which they are passed through into inflation.  For 
small depreciations, the balance of effects is the opposite; small depreciations are more likely 
therefore to satisfy the conditions for an expansionary devaluation.  There is a range of exchange 
rates far from prior levels for which -δ > β, in other words, and another range closer to prior levels 
where -δ < β.
50  While this nonlinearity in the effect of the exchange rate on output might seem 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
suppressed in this simple model by omitting that price level from the aggregate demand equation. 
49The same is now true of a negative Calvo shock: the tendency for higher (domestic and world) interest rates to 
depress output is offset by policies that push the exchange rate up and strengthen balance sheets. 
50If, for example, if default rates are not just proportional to the rate of currency depreciation but increase at an 
accelerating pace, this could plausibly be the case.  
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arbitrary, it is precisely the way authors like Aghion, Baccheta and Banerjee (1999) and Krugman 
(2001) model the interplay of competitiveness and balance-sheet effects: the former dominates for 
small depreciations but the latter dominate for large ones, producing a nonlinear aggregate equation 
of precisely the sort being assumed here. 
If the exchange rate then falls sufficiently to enter the first range, an inflation-targeting central 
bank will raise interest rates sharply and push the currency up quickly in order to minimize financial 
damage to banks, firms and households.  But if the depreciation is modest, so too will be the rise in 
interest rates; the central bank will allow the currency to fall to a new lower level so long as the 
competitiveness effects continue to dominate the balance-sheet effects.  In fact, heavy intervention 
when the exchange rate drops precipitously but light intervention when it fluctuates around normal 
levels is not unlike the observed behavior of many central banks.    
It is important to emphasize that liability dollarization, as analyzed here, in no sense 
precludes inflation targeting.  The preceding propositions for how the central bank should respond 
flow directly from the standard inflation-targeting framework.  But in the extreme case of liability 
dollarization where interest-rate cuts depress output as well as aggravating inflation (that is, where -
δ > β), that response will be such as to limit exchange rate variability.  If the perceived advantage of 
inflation targeting is that it permits a greater exchange rate flexibility (compared to the alternative of 
a hard peg), then the advantages of inflation targeting are in practice correspondingly less in highly 
dollarized economies.  
This discussion assumes that the output effects of liability dollarization are independent of 
the policy regime.  This assumption may be no more appropriate here than it is for passthrough and 
indexation.  The greater exchange rate variability that the shift from pegging to inflation targeting  
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implies, even if it is slight, will encourage hedging by banks and corporates.  Whereas a policy of 
pegging the currency is tantamount to providing implicit insurance against currency risk, which 
discourages private purchases of currency hedges (why hedge when doing so is costly and the 
government avers its commitment to limiting currency fluctuations?), the knowledge that the 
exchange rate is allowed to move on a daily basis will strengthen the hand of a chief financial officer 
trying to convince his CEO of the importance of purchasing a hedge.  Precisely those banks and 
corporates most vulnerable to financial distress because the liability side of their balance sheets is 
dollarized will have the greatest incentive to hedge.   Even if banks and firms are unable to borrow 
abroad in their own currency in the aggregate, they will have an incentive to redistribute that foreign 
exposure in ways that limit the adverse output effects of depreciation.  Thus, the adverse balance 
sheet effects that occur in a country that has traditionally oriented its monetary policy strategy around 
the level of the exchange rate may not be a good guide to the magnitude of these effects when the 
central bank shifts to an inflation targeting regime that implies even a modest increase in exchange 
rate flexibility.  And even a modest increase in exchange rate flexibility that leads to a modest 
increase in hedging will make it optimal for an inflation-targeting central bank to allow a bit more 
exchange rate flexibility, which may encourage a bit more hedging, and so on.  If the demand for 
unhedged dollar liabilities is endogenous, then behavior under the new regime -- by the central bank 
as well as the private sector -- may be quite different from behavior under the old one. 
What if this response is not forthcoming, perhaps because the relevant hedging instruments 
are not available?  If the authorities are concerned that inflation targeting still looks too much like a 
de facto soft peg, rendering the country vulnerable to a build-up of speculative pressure, then it may 
be possible to fulfill the desire for greater flexibility only through the imposition of limits on gross  
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and net foreign currency exposures.  The regulatory authorities will have to limit the gross foreign-
currency exposures of the banking system (and strengthen corporate governance and prudential 
practices in the financial sector so as to encourage banks to better manage and limit those exposures 
on their own).  The central government will have to limit its foreign-currency borrowing to the extent 
that its domestic-currency-denominated revenues are imperfectly indexed to the exchange rate, and it 
should similarly takes steps to discourage excessive foreign-currency borrowing by states and 
municipalities.  
Such measures are in fact integral to the agenda pursued by G-7 governments and the 
multilaterals under the umbrella of the “new international financial architecture.”  Greater exchange 
rate flexibility has also been an element of this agenda.
51  But if this ability to regulate markets (and 
for markets to regulate themselves) is beyond the capacity of an emerging economy, then evasion and 
regulatory laxity will result in destabilizing balance-sheet effects, undermining the viability of an 
inflation targeting regime that aspires to permit increased exchange rate flexibility.  It is revealing 
that those emerging markets which have moved to inflation targeting and have succeeded in 
achieving greater de facto exchange rate flexibility have generally had relatively well-developed 
financial systems and regulatory capacity. 
One can question whether the solution is worth the price.  If the exchange rate movements 
implied by inflation targeting are compatible with financial instability only when foreign borrowing 
is curtailed, then the cost may be slow growth and underdevelopment.  The severity of this risk 
depends on one’s evaluation of the importance of foreign capital for domestic development and of 
                                                           
51In either a rare instance of internal consistency or a fortuitous coincidence.  
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the extent to which gross (as opposed to net) exposures must be curtailed to reconcile exchange rate 
flexibility with financial stability.  Those fearful that curtailing capital flows will hinder growth 
logically prefer full dollarization. 
D.  Credibility Problems 
We have already seen how the difficulty of forecasting inflation can lessen the credibility of 
inflation targeting in emerging markets (although I have argued that the point should not be pushed 
too far).  In addition, a history of arbitrary enforcement that lessens respect for constitutional and 
statutory law may limit the effective independence of the central bank, whose insulation from 
pressure to pump up activity before an election or to help meet the government’s financial needs is a 
prerequisite for effective inflation targeting.  Central bankers threatened with dismissal, 
notwithstanding laws ostensibly guaranteeing them long terms in office, will be more inclined to 
bow to pressure to purchase government securities on the primary market.  And chronic budget 
deficits can convince even an independent central bank that it has no choice but to meet the 
government’s fiscal needs if it wishes to preserve financial stability, sowing the seeds of time 
inconsistency.
52 
Historically, lack of effective central bank independence has been a major impediment to the 
pursuit of an independent monetary policy in developing countries.  At the same time, emerging 
markets have come a long way in recent years in developing political support for low inflation and 
                                                           
52It is revealing that emerging markets have generally introduced full-fledged inflation targeting only after first 
attaining strong fiscal positions.  See Schoechter, Stone and Zelmer (2000).  Then there is the argument of whether 
inflation targeting is part of the solution to the problem of “fiscal dominance,” as the time inconsistency problem created 
by chronic deficits is known.  This is, of course, the same argument made by some advocates of hard pegs and is open to 
the same objections.  I return to this point below.  
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buttressing the independence of their central banks.
53  Although budget deficits have been chronic 
problems, there has also been considerable progress in strengthening fiscal institutions and bringing 
down budget deficits.
54  The dozen or so transition economies seeking membership in the EU and its 
monetary union, for example, have made very considerable progress in bringing their deficits and 
debts to within the Maastricht Treaty’s 3 and 60 per cent ceilings. 
To the extent that inflation targeting is less credible in emerging markets, its benefits will be 
less.  Absent confidence that the central bank is committed to low inflation, interest rates will not fall 
to the levels of other low-inflation countries.  Shocks will raise questions about whether the 
authorities are prepared to stay the course.  Sharp changes in interest rates, exchange rates and 
international capital flows may feed upon themselves: financial variables will be volatile, with 
negative implications for the economy.  If policy is not credible, then firms will not reduce price 
increases to meet the inflation target.  Hitting it will require an increase in interest rates sufficient to 
deliver a substantial reduction in import prices (through a sharp appreciation of the exchange rate), 
with destabilizing output effects.
55 
                                                           
53A comprehensive compendium of the relevant evidence is Mahadeva and Storne (2000). 
54I say more on the reform of fiscal institutions below. 
55The same negative implications also follow, of course, for any other monetary regime if the financial system is 
fragile, the commitment to fiscal discipline is questionable, the monetary authorities lack autonomy and independence, 
and the economy is subject to foreign disturbances.  I return to this point in the conclusion.  
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A wide variety of models of monetary policy point to the fact that there is a tradeoff between 
flexibility and credibility.  Central banks most lacking in credibility will have an incentive to move 
along the frontier of feasible credibility-flexibility combinations in order to obtain it.  In particular, 
imperfect credibility may require the central bank to target inflation rigidly.  Absent credibility 
problems, a central bank faced with inflation in excess of its target may want to raise interest rates 
and damp down inflation only gradually in order to avoid causing or compounding a recession.  
Faced with a weak banking system ill prepared to absorb interest rate increases, which raise the cost 
of servicing its short-term liabilities and increase default rates by borrowers, it may want to limit 
interest-rate volatility and administer its anti-inflationary medicine in small doses.  But if the 
monetary authorities fail to respond quickly when inflation heats up, observers may begin to wonder 
whether they are optimally trading off objectives or they are in fact not really committed to price 
stability.  Asset prices and the variables they affect will not respond as hoped.  Similarly, if the 
central bank targets core rather than headline inflation, observers may wonder whether this is 
because monetary policy should not attempt to offset temporary commodity price fluctuations, or 
whether the authorities are really just seeking an excuse to disregard inflationary pressures.
56  
Monetary policy will thus have to respond more sharply to exchange rate and commodity-price 
fluctuations than would be the case if it was being implemented by a highly credible central bank.  
The monetary authorities may not be able to afford even modest deviations from strict inflation 
targeting for fear of sending the wrong signal. 
In addition, central banks in emerging markets will have an incentive to use transparency to 
                                                           
56In countries where the authorities have manipulated price indices in the past, they may question whether an 
index specially constructed for use in inflation targeting can be taken at face value.  
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further enhance their credibility.  This will tend to push them in the direction of a fully-articulated 
inflation-targeting framework rather than the seat-of-the-pants approach preferred by, inter alia, the 
Federal Reserve.  Its hard-won credibility allows the Federal Reserve Board to hint at its inflation 
forecast rather than announcing it.  It allows the Fed to sketch the model used to link its policy 
instruments to that forecast rather than describing it in any great detail.  Most emerging markets do 
not enjoy this luxury.
57  To convince investors that they mean what they say, their central banks will 
have to publish the forecast and the model.  Chile, for one, has moved in this direction, while Mexico 
and Brazil publish an Inflation Report. 
Another implication is that effective inflation targeting will require steps to eliminate fiscal 
dominance as a way of building credibility.  In particular, inflation targeting must be supported by 
the reform and reinforcement of fiscal institutions as a way of delivering better fiscal outcomes.  
Fiscal-policy making processes and procedures should be centralized to reduce free riding.  Vertical 
fiscal imbalances should be reduced.  The budget constraints facing sub-central governments should 
be hardened.
58  An example of progress in this direction is Brazil’s Fiscal Responsibility Law, which 
bans the federal government from bailing out debt-ridden states and municipalities and has produced 
visible improvements in state and municipal fiscal performance.  The federal fiscal authorities, for 
their part, can invest in the monetary regime so as to intentionally incur costs if it fails, further 
limiting problems of time inconsistency.  Thus, inflation targets in a number of emerging markets are 
                                                           
57As Jonas (2000, p.3) writes of the Czech case, “The “just-do-it” approach to monetary policy probably would 
not be very effective in bringing inflation expectations and actual inflation down.  Public announcements by the CNB 
about its expectations of future inflation would also probably not suffice to anchor inflation expectations and persuade 
economic agents that monetary policy would be actually conducted with the aim to achieve the announced inflation.” 
58There is evidence that more centralized and hierarchical fiscal policy-making processes lead to better fiscal 
outcomes and that large vertical imbalances heighten bailout and inflation risk (von Hagen and Eichengreen 1996).  
         38 
 
announced not by the central bank but by the government (Chile, Poland) or by the central bank and 
government jointly (Brazil, Israel) precisely as a way for the government to commit to the fiscal 
discipline needed to achieve the target. 
These implications are evident in the behavior of those emerging markets that have embraced 
inflation targeting.  Such countries have generally moved toward the adoption of a formal 
framework.  Their central banks have been reluctant to miss the inflation target even temporarily, or 
to slow the pace at which deviations between target inflation and actual inflation are eliminated, for 
fear of undermining their anti-inflationary credibility.
59  The credibility problem has tended to dictate 
that the change in the CPI must be the operational measure of inflation, because it is widely 
understood and therefore more credible, even when core inflation purged of import-price fluctuations 
would be more appropriate in principle.
60  
Credibility problems make inflation targeting less attractive.  They imply more volatility and 
less flexible policy implementation.   The question is then how quickly credibility can be gained, and 
whether or not inflation targeting can be part of that process.        
 
                                                           
59While the Czech Republic and South Africa have escape clauses spelling out in advance the circumstances 
over which targets may be missed and requiring the central bank to indicate the time frame over which it will attempt to 
return to the target inflation path, in practice neither country has been willing to utilize the provision. 
60Chile is thus said to have chosen “a clear and widely understood index like the headline CPI....[in order] to 
enhance the communicational effectiveness of inflation targeting.” Morande (2000), p.161.  From this point of view it is 
no coincidence that emerging market inflation targeters typically target the CPI while industrial-country inflation targeters 
generally target core inflation (Schoechter, Stone and Zelmer 2000).  
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4.  Conclusion 
Inflation targeting is the increasingly fashionable alternative for countries unable or unwilling 
to abolish the national currency.
61  It is seen as providing a coherent alternative to exchange-rate-
based monetary policy strategies that are overly restrictive and crisis prone.  But is it feasible for 
emerging markets?   
Inflation targeting is difficult in emerging markets for three reasons: they are open, their 
liabilities are dollarized, and their policy makers lack credibility.  Openness exposes their economies 
to external disturbances.
62  It makes inflation forecasting more difficult.  And it opens additional, 
exchange-rate related channels linking the central bank’s instruments and targets that operate with 
very different control lags.  Because an inflation-targeting central bank will want to respond 
differently to exchange rate changes depending on their source and persistence, these problems 
cannot be solved simply by adding the exchange rate to the standard reaction function.  None of this 
is to suggest that inflation targeting is infeasible in open economies, only that it is more complicated 
to operate.   
Liability dollarization introduces more fundamental complications.  Financial institutions and 
their customers will be saddled with currency mismatches, given the difficulty these countries have 
in borrowing abroad in their own currencies.  Under these circumstances, an inflation targeting 
central bank will be reluctant to let the exchange rate move; it will be unable to partake of the greater 
flexibility ostensibly offered by that regime.   
                                                           
61Or, in the European case, by joining a monetary union in partnership with the issuers of a recognized 
international currency. 
62In this respect, it obviously complicates the execution and effects of any monetary policy operating strategy, 
and not just inflation targeting.  I return to this momentarily.  
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In practice, whether countries with partially dollarized economies reap any advantages from 
inflation targeting -- whether the framework will provide even limited scope for policy autonomy, 
and in particular whether it will enable them to allow the exchange rate to fluctuate more freely -- 
depends on the exact nature, extent, and effects of their liability dollarization.  If even a small 
depreciation of the exchange rate threatens to destabilize balance sheets and output (in other words, 
if the country immediately enters the zone where depreciation and lower interest rates are 
recessionary), then the central bank will be unwilling to let the exchange rate to move.  In this case, 
inflation targeting and a hard peg are basically indistinguishable.  If the perceived advantage of 
inflation targeting is that it permits a greater flexibility, then the advantages of inflation targeting are 
correspondingly less in highly dollarized economies.  Inflation targeting has no obvious advantages 
under these circumstances, while a hard peg has the advantages of simplicity, transparency and 
credibility. 
For countries where the adverse balance sheet effects dominate only when exchange rate 
movements reach a certain point, conventional inflation targeting will be viable so long as shocks 
and corresponding exchange rate movements are small, while the desire to intervene and stabilize the 
exchange rate will dominate when they grow large.  The greater exchange rate flexibility promised 
by inflation targeting will be possible, although the central bank’s appetite for indulging in it will 
have limits. 
Such countries will wish to implement inflation targeting in flexibly, by adjusting monetary 
policy in response to large exchange rate movements, for example, while treating small movements 
with benign neglect.  Unfortunately, flexibility can be destabilizing when credibility is lacking.  A 
central bank that temporarily disregards a surge in inflation in order to, say, stabilize the financial  
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system may find its commitment to price stability questioned.  Credibility problems will force 
precisely those emerging markets where a flexible approach to inflation targeting is most valuable to 
adopt a relatively rigid version.
63  
These observations suggest what countries should find inflation targeting attractive.  Inflation 
targeting will be less attractive the more open the economy, for the reasons detailed several 
paragraphs back.  Note the consonance of this argument with a key implication of theory of optimum 
currency areas.  Inflation targeting will be less attractive the dimmer the prospects of the central bank 
acquiring policy credibility.  Note this time the consonance of this argument with the idea that 
countries in crisis whose credibility has been shredded should rebuild their reputations by 
dollarizing.  Finally, inflation targeting will be more attractive where liability dollarization is limited 
and banks and corporations have markets on which to hedge their exposures, so that limited 
exchange rate fluctuations will not irreparably damage their balance sheets.  Note here the 
consonance of this observation with popular explanations for the success of inflation targeting in 
Brazil. 
On the other hand, emerging markets that are less open, that have well regulated financial 
                                                           
63Even if they do, questions about the central bank’s intentions and independence mean that financial variables 
and the nonfinancial magnitudes they affect will be more volatile than in a country whose inflation-targeting central bank 
enjoys greater credibility.  Under such circumstances, it is unrealistic to promise that volatility will fall to the levels 
enjoyed by advanced-industrial economies that target inflation.  The same is true, of course, of any other monetary 
regime so long as the financial system is fragile, the commitment to fiscal discipline is questionable, and the economy is 
subject to foreign disturbances.  A dollarized emerging market subject to these conditions will similarly be more volatile 
than the typical advanced-industrial country.  Some may argue that the very act of dollarizing can solve all problems of 
financial fragility.  Others will suggest that explicit inflation targeting can solve problems of fiscal indiscipline.  If either 
argument is correct, then it creates a strong presumption in favor of one or the other of these regimes.  But most readers 
presumably believe that financial problems have deeper roots than simply the monetary regime, and that fiscal problems 
are a function of more than just the availability of seignorage revenues.  This is just another way of saying that a mere 
change in monetary regime is unlikely to solve all problems of economic development, miraculously transforming 
developing countries into G7 nations.  
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institutions and markets on which foreign exposures can be hedged, and whose central banks possess 
a reasonable degree of policy credibility may prefer inflation targeting.   The question is how many 
emerging markets will soon fall under this heading.    




Aghion, Philippe, Philippe Bachetta and Abijit Banerjee (1999), “Capital Markets and Instability in 
Open Economies,” unpublished manuscript, Study Center Gerzensee. 
 
Armour, Jamie and Agathe Cote (1999-2000), “Feedback Rules for Inflation Control: An Overview 
of Recent Literature,” Bank of Canada Review (Winter), pp.43-54. 
 
Ball, Lawrence (1999), “Policy Rules for Open Economies,” in John Taylor (ed.), Monetary Policy 
Rules, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, pp.127-156. 
 
Ball, Lawrence (2000), “Policy Rules and External Shocks,” NBER Working Paper no. 7910 
(September). 
 
Bernanke, Ben, Thomas Lubach, Frederic Mishkin and Adam Posen (1999), Inflation Targeting: 
Lessons from the International Experience, Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
 
Bharucha, Nargis and Christopher Kent (1998), “Inflation Targeting in a Small Open Economy,” 
Discussion Paper no. 98-07, Reserve Bank of Australia (July). 
 
Bogdanski, Joel, Alexandre Tombini and Sergio Werlang (2000), “Implementing Inflation Targeting 
in Brazil,” Working Paper no. 1, Central Bank of Brazil (July). 
 
Calvo, Guillermo (1986), “Temporary Stabilization: Predetermined Exchange Rates,” Journal of 
Political Economy 94, pp.1319-1329. 
 
Calvo, Guillermo (2000a), “The Case for Hard Pegs,” unpublished manuscript, University of 
Maryland at College Park. 
 
Calvo, Guillermo (2000b), “Capital Markets and the Exchange Rate, with Special Reference to the 
Dollarization Debate in Latin America,” unpublished manuscript, University of Maryland at College 
Park. 
 
Calvo, Guillermo and Carmen Reinhart (2000), “Fear of Floating,” NBER Working Paper no. 7993 
(November). 
 
Cepedes, Luis Felipe, Roberto Chang and Andres Velasco (2001), “Dollarization of Liabilities, Net 
Worth Effects, and Optimal Monetary Policy,” unpublished manuscript, NYU, Rutgers and Harvard 
University.  
 
Christoffersen, Peter and Robert Wescott (1999), “Is Poland Ready for Inflation Targeting?” IMF 
Working Paper no. 99/41 (March).  
         44 
 
 
Cooper, Richard (1999), “Exchange Rate Choices,” in Jane Sneddon Little and Giovanni Olivei 
(eds), Rethinking the International Monetary System, Boston: Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, 
pp.99-123. 
 
De Brouwer, G. and J. O’Regan (1997), “Evaluating Simple Monetary-Policy Rules for Australia,” 
in Philip Lowe (ed.), Monetary Policy and Inflation Targeting, Sydney: Reserve Bank of Australia, 
pp.244-276. 
 
Devereux, Michael and Philip Lane (2000), “Exchange Rates and Monetary Policy in Emerging 
Market Economies,” unpublished manuscript, University of British Columbia and Hong Kong 
Monetary Authority. 
 
Eichengreen, Barry (2000), “When to Dollarize,” Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 
(forthcoming). 
 
Eichengreen, Barry, Paul Masson, Miguel Savastano and Sunil Sharma (1999), “Transition Strategies 
and Nominal Anchors on the Road to Greater Exchange Rate Flexibility,” Essays in International 
Finance no.213, International Finance Section, Department of Economics, Princeton University 
(April). 
 
Freedman, Charles (1994), “The Use of Indicators and of the Monetary Conditions Index in Canada,” 
in Tomas J.T. Balino and Carlo Cottarelli (eds), Frameworks for Monetary Stability, Washington, 
D.C.: International Monetary Fund, pp.458-477. 
 
Gomez, Javier (2000), “Inflation Targeting and Openness,” unpublished manuscript, Central Bank of 
Colombia. 
 
Hausmann, Ricardo (1999), “Should There Be 5 Currencies or 105?” Foreign Policy 122, pp.44-53. 
 
Hoffmaister, Alexander (1999), “Inflation Targeting in Korea: An Empirical Exploration,” IMF 
Working Paper no. WP/99/7, Washington, D.C.: IMF (January). 
 
Hunt, Ben (1999), “Inter-Forecast Monetary Policy Implementation: Fixed-Instrument versus MCI-
Based Strategies,” Discussion Paper no. G99/1, Reserve Bank of New Zealand (March). 
 
International Monetary Fund (1999), Hungary: Selected Issues, IMF Staff Country Report no. 99/27, 
Washington, D.C.: IMF. 
 
J. P. Morgan (2001), “Hungary Joings Inflation Targeting Club ‘Implicitly’,” Global Data Watch 15 
June, pp.11-12. 
 
Jonas, Jiri (2000), “Inflation Targeting in Transition Economies: Some Issues and Experience,” in  
         45 
 
Warren Coats (ed.), Inflation Targeting in Transition Ecoomies: The Case of the Czech Republic 
(forthcoming). 
 
Krugman, Paul (2001), “Crises: The Next Generation,” unpublished manuscript, Princeton 
University. 
 
Kumhof, Michael (2000), “Inflation Targeting Under Imperfect Credibility,” unpublished 
manuscript, Department of Economics, Stanford University. 
 
Leiderman, Leo and Gil Bufman (2001), “Surprises on Israel’s Road to Exchange Rate Flexibility,” 
Emerging Markets Research, Deutsche Bank, 23 March. 
 
Levin, Andrew, Volker Wieland and John C. Williams (1999), “Robustness of Simple Monetary 
Policy Rules Under Model Uncertainty,” in John Taylor (ed.), Monetary Policy Rules, Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, pp.263-299. 
 
Mahadeva, Lavan and Gabriel Stern, eds. (2000), Monetary Policy Frameworks in a Global Context, 
London: Routledge. 
 
Masson, Paul (1999), “Monetary and Exchange Rate Policy of Transition Economies of Central and 
Eastern Europe After the Launch of EMU,” Policy Discussion Paper no. PDP/99/5, International 
Monetary Fund (July). 
 
Masson, Paul, Miguel Savastano and Sunil Sharma (1997), “The Scope for Inflation Targeting in 
Developing Countries,” IMF Working Paper no. 130 (October). 
 
Mishkin, Frederic (2000a), “Inflation Targeting for Emerging-Market Economies,” American 
Economic Review Papers and Proceedings 90, pp.105-109. 
 
Mishkin, Federic (2000b), “Issues in Inflation Targeting,” in Bank of Canada, Price Stability and the 
Long-Run Target for Monetary Policy, Ottawa: Bank of Canada (forthcoming). 
 
Mishkin, Frederic (2001), “Financial Policies and the Prevention of Financial Crises in Emerging 
Market Economies,” NBER Working Paper no. 8087 (January). 
 
Mishkin, Frederic and Miguel Savastano (2000), “Monetary Policy Strategies for Latin America,” 
NBER Working Paper no. 7617 (March). 
 
Morande, Felipe G. (2000), “A Decade of Inflation Targeting in Chile: Main Developments and 
Lessons,” in Charles Joseph and Anton Gunawan (eds), Monetary Policy and Inflation Targeting in 
Emerging Economies, Jakarta: Bank Indonesia, pp.149-179. 
  
         46 
 
Mundell, Robert (2000), “The International Monetary System in the 21
st Century,” Latrobe, Penn.: 
St. Vincent’s College. 
 
Rivas, Luis A. (2001), “Underlying Inflation Measures as Short-Run Inflation Targets in Developing 
Economies: The Case of Nicaragua,” unpublished manuscript, Central Bank of Nicaragua. 
 
Ryan, Chris and Christopher Thompson (2000), “Inflation Targeting and Exchange Rate Fluctuations 
in Australia,” Research Discussion Paper 2000-06, Reserve Bank of Australia (September). 
 
Sachs, Jeffrey A. (1980), “Wages, Flexible Exchange Rates, and Macroeconomic Policy,” Quarterly 
Journal of Economics 94, pp.737-747. 
 
Schaechter, Andrea, Mark R. Stone and Mark Zelmer (2000), “Adopting Inflation Targeting: 
Practical Issues for Emerging Market Countries,” Occasional Paper no. 202, Washington, D.C.: 
IMF. 
 
Svensson, Lars (1996), “Commentary,” in Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, Achieving Price 
Stability, Kansas City: Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, pp.209-228. 
 
Svensson, Lars (1997), “Inflation Forecast Targeting: Implementing and Monitoring Inflation 
Targeting,” European Economic Review 41, pp.1111-1146.   
 
Svensson, Lars (1999), “Inflation Targeting as a Monetary Policy Rule,” Journal of Monetary 
Economics 43, pp.607-654. 
 
Svensson, Lars (2000), “Open-Economy Inflation Targeting,” Journal of International Economics 
50, pp.155-183. 
 
Taylor, John B. (1993), “Discretion Versus Policy Rules in Practice,” Carnegie Rochester 
Conference Series on Public Policy 39, pp.195-214. 
 
Von Hagen, Juergen and Barry Eichengreen (1996), “Fiscal Restraints, Federalism and European 
Monetary Union: Is the Excessive Deficit Procedure Counterproductive?” American Economic 
Review Papers and Proceedings 86, pp.134-138. 
 
Williamson, John (2000), “Exchange Rate Regimes for Emerging Markets: Reviving the 
Intermediate Option,” Policy Analyses in International Economics 60, Washington, D.C.: Institute 





    47 
Banco Central do Brasil 
 
 
Trabalhos para Discussão 
Os Trabalhos para Discussão podem ser acessados na internet, no formato PDF, 
no endereço: http://www.bc.gov.br 
 
Working Paper Series 





1  Implementing Inflation Targeting in Brazil 




2  Política Monetária e Supervisão do Sistema Financeiro Nacional no 
Banco Central do Brasil 
Eduardo Lundberg 
 









3  Private Sector Participation: a Theoretical Justification of the Brazilian 
Position 
Sérgio Ribeiro da Costa Werlang 
 
July/2000 
4  An Information Theory Approach to the Aggregation of Log-Linear 
Models 
Pedro H. Albuquerque 
 
July/2000 
5  The Pass-Through from Depreciation to Inflation: a Panel Study 
Ilan Goldfajn and  Sérgio Ribeiro da Costa Werlang 
 
July/2000 
6  Optimal Interest Rate Rules in Inflation Targeting Frameworks 
José Alvaro Rodrigues Neto, Fabio Araújo and Marta Baltar J. Moreira 
 
July/2000 




8  The Correlation Matrix of the Brazilian Central Bank’s Standard 
Model for Interest Rate Market Risk 
José Alvaro Rodrigues Neto 
 
Set/2000 





    48 
10  Análise do Financiamento Externo a uma Pequena Economia 
Aplicação da Teoria do Prêmio Monetário ao Caso Brasileiro: 1991–1998 
Carlos Hamilton Vasconcelos Araújo e Renato Galvão Flôres Júnior 
 
Mar/2001 
11  A Note on the Efficient Estimation of Inflation in Brazil 
Michael F. Bryan and Stephen G. Cecchetti 
 
Mar/2001 
12  A Test of Competition in Brazilian Banking 
Márcio I. Nakane 
 
Mar/2001 
13  Modelos de Previsão de Insolvência Bancária no Brasil 
Marcio Magalhães Janot 
 
Mar/2001 
14  Evaluating Core Inflation Measures for Brazil 
Francisco Marcos Rodrigues Figueiredo 
 
Mar/2001 
15  Is It Worth Tracking Dollar/Real Implied Volatility? 
Sandro Canesso de Andrade and Benjamin Miranda Tabak 
 
Mar/2001 
16  Avaliação das Projeções do Modelo Estrutural do Banco Central do 
Brasil Para a Taxa de Variação do IPCA 
Sergio Afonso Lago Alves 
 
Evaluation of the Central Bank of Brazil Structural Model’s Inflation 
Forecasts in an Inflation Targeting Framework 









17  Estimando o Produto Potencial Brasileiro: uma Abordagem de Função 
de Produção 
Tito Nícias Teixeira da Silva Filho 
 
Estimating Brazilian Potential Output: a Production Function 
Approach 







18  A Simple Model for Inflation Targeting in Brazil 
Paulo Springer de Freitas and Marcelo Kfoury Muinhos 
 
Apr/2001 
19  Uncovered Interest Parity with Fundamentals: a Brazilian Exchange 
Rate Forecast Model 
Marcelo Kfoury Muinhos, Paulo Springer de Freitas and Fabio Araújo 
 
May/2001 
20  Credit Channel without the LM Curve 
Victorio Y. T. Chu and Márcio I. Nakane 
 
May/2001 
21  Os Impactos Econômicos da CPMF: Teoria e Evidência 
Pedro H. Albuquerque 
 
Jun/2001 
22 Decentralized  Portfolio  Management 




    49 
23  Os Efeitos da CPMF sobre a Intermediação Financeira 
Sérgio Mikio Koyama e Márcio I. Nakane 
 
Jul/2001 
24  Inflation Targeting in Brazil: Shocks, Backward-Looking Prices, and 
IMF Conditionality 
Joel Bogdanski, Paulo Springer de Freitas, Ilan Goldfajn and 
Alexandre Antonio Tombini 
 
Aug/2001 





26  Inflation Targeting in an Open Financially Integrated Emerging 
Economy: the Case of Brazil 





Complementaridade e Fungibilidade dos Fluxos de Capitais 
Internacionais 





Regras Monetárias e Dinâmica Macroeconômica no Brasil: uma 
Abordagem de Expectativas Racionais 
Marco Antonio Bonomo e Ricardo D. Brito 
 
Nov/2001 
29  Using a Money Demand Model to Evaluate Monetary Policies in Brazil 
Pedro H. Albuquerque and Solange Gouvêa 
 
Nov/2001 
30  Testing the Expectations Hypothesis in the Brazilian Term Structure of 
Interest Rates 
Benjamin Miranda Tabak and Sandro Canesso de Andrade 
 
Nov/2001 
31  Algumas Considerações sobre a Sazonalidade no IPCA 
Francisco Marcos R. Figueiredo e Roberta Blass Staub 
 
Nov/2001 
32  Crises Cambiais e Ataques Especulativos no Brasil 
Mauro Costa Miranda 
 
Nov/2001 




34  Constrained Discretion and Collective Action Problems: Reflections on 
the Resolution of International Financial Crises 
Arminio Fraga and Daniel Luiz Gleizer 
 
Nov/2001 
35  Uma Definição Operacional de Estabilidade de Preços 
Tito Nícias Teixeira da Silva Filho 
 
Dez/2001 
 